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Abstract—In emergency and abnormal conditions, a 
power system operator has to deal with a large amount of 
data and apply most appropriate remedial actions. However, 
due to emotional and psychological stress, an operator may 
not be able to adequately respond to critical conditions and 
make correct decisions. Mistakes can damage very expensive 
power system equipment or worse lead to major emergencies 
and catastrophic situations. Intelligent systems can play an 
advisory role suggesting the necessary actions, which should 
be taken to deal with a given emergency or abnormal 
condition as well as identifying failures of protection systems 
and circuit breakers.  This paper outlines some experience 
obtained at the School of Engineering of the University of 
Tasmania in developing intelligent systems for power systems 
security. An expert system for clearing overloads applies the 
network sensitivity factors to determine appropriate actions, 
which include generation rescheduling, network 
reconfiguration and load shedding.  An expert system for 
voltage control is developed and used for detecting voltage 
violations and providing a set of effective control actions to 
solve voltage problems in real-time. An artificial neural 
network is used to identify multiple failures of protection 
relays and circuit breakers.  This system uses information 
received from protection systems in the form of alarms and is 
able to deal with incomplete and distorted data. 
 
Keywords—-computational intelligence, power system, 
emergency condition, crisis management 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Computational intelligence can be considered as a 
successor of artificial intelligence [1-3].  It uses advanced 
heuristic search algorithms, artificial neural networks, the 
theory of fuzzy sets and evolutionary computation.  
Computational intelligence also employs such techniques 
as swarm intelligence, chaos theory, artificial immune 
systems, wavelet analysis, etc. 
Since the early 1990s, computational intelligence 
techniques have been successfully applied in power 
systems [4-7].  Applications related to power system 
security are of particular interest in this paper. 
Power system security includes measures which intend 
to keep the system in an operating condition when one or 
even a few components fail to operate.  For example, a 
generating unit may fail but the remaining units of the 
system can increase power output to make up the deficit, 
and thus prevent the load shedding.  Similarly, a power 
transmission line may be damaged and switched-off by the 
power system protection but the remaining transmission 
lines can take the increased load. 
In order to prevent a power system from collapse, its 
elements are operated within certain constraints and 
protected by automatic devices that cause equipment to be 
taken off if those constraints are violated.  However, due to 
some failures, equipment may still be left in the operating 
state with constraints violated.  Such conditions may lead 
in turn to switching-off other equipment out of service and 
if this process continues, large parts or even the entire 
system can collapse completely. 
A major emergency in a power system might start with 
opening-off a single line as a result of a short-circuit.  The 
remaining transmission system takes up the power that was 
flowing on that line.  However, if even one of the 
remaining lines is now overloaded, it also may open due to 
an operation of the protection system, and thus an 
additional load is imposed on the remaining network.  
Moreover, a certain transmission line outage can cause 
some serious voltage problems as well. Therefore, power 
system operators are required to take immediate actions to 
avoid a further deterioration of the situation. 
In emergency and abnormal conditions, a power system 
operator has to deal with a large amount of data and apply 
the most appropriate remedial actions.  However, due to 
emotional and psychological stress, an operator may not be 
able to adequately respond to critical conditions and make 
correct decisions.  Moreover, in emergency conditions, a 
vital decision must often be taken in a matter of minutes, 
sometimes even seconds.  Mistakes can damage very 
expensive power system equipment or worse lead to the 
major emergencies and even catastrophic events.  There is 
no time to examine advantages and disadvantages of 
different approaches to the restoration process and look 
into long columns of results.  Nevertheless, an operator 
must respond to an emergency and only his or her 
experience can help to find a right decision.  Clearly, there 
is a strong need for an aid (or decision support system) 
formalizing the operator’s knowledge. 
This paper outlines some experience obtained at the 
School of Engineering of the University of Tasmania in 
developing intelligent systems for power system security.  
 
 
II. BA S I C S  O F  PO W E R  SY S T EM  AN A L Y S I S 
Modern power control centers are equipped with 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems gathering data on-line. SCADA systems enable a 
power system operator to apply real-time methods for 
power system analysis.  Power operators have substantial 
experience in utilizing optimal power flows, state 
estimation, on-line security estimation and other software 
packages.  The conventional methods employed for power 
system analysis rely on mathematical models and 
sophisticated programming techniques.  However, the 
complexity and size of modern power systems such that 
complete computational solutions usually cannot be 
obtained in a timely fashion, and thus cannot be used in 
emergency conditions for decision support. 
Therefore, an alternative method called the decoupled 
load flow [8] is often used in emergency conditions.  This 
method improves a computational efficiency and reduces 
computer storage requirements.  It is reliable in solving 
difficult cases for large-scale power transmission systems.  
The major principles of the decoupled approach are based 
on two general rules: 
 
• Real power flow P between two busses connected 
through a power transmission line is primarily affected 
by the change in voltage angle δ between these busses. 
 
• Reactive power flow Q between two busses connected 
through a power transmission line is primarily affected 
by the change in the voltage magnitude ⏐V⏐ at these 
busses. 
 
This approach makes it possible to develop intelligent 
systems for real-time applications. 
III.  IN T E L L I G E N T  SY S T E M  FO R  CL E A R I NG  
OV E R L O A DS 
A. Background 
An accurate determination of permissible overloading 
durations for power system equipment allows operators a 
greater flexibility in decision making and in choosing 
suitable remedial actions. From an operator point of view, 
the most hazardous overloads are these which occur on 
large system transformers connecting the various voltage 
level networks, and on the tie power transmission lines 
connecting different power subsystems.  Therefore, it is 
vital to examine factors setting limits on the overloading 
time of these elements. 
Short-term loading capabilities of transformers depend 
on the ambient air temperature and the loading time.  When 
the load increases the transformer temperature will rise and 
the ageing of insulating materials accelerates.  Ageing sets 
certain limits to the loading capability of a transformer.  
Operating conditions at the rated power and ambient air 
temperature of +20°C are considered normal.  In such 
cases, insulating materials will age at a normal speed and a 
proper maintenance can be provided.  In practice, however, 
the load and temperature can vary according to the power 
demand and weather conditions.  If part of the operating 
time the transformer loading is lower than its continuous 
loading capacity it can be loaded more at the other times 
such that the ageing remains normal during the whole 
period (for example, during a 24-hour period).  Therefore, 
permissible time for clearing transformer overloads should 
take into account the previous loading of the transformer or 
its loading history. 
For transmission lines, both the power limit and the 
permissible duration of an overload in most cases are 
governed by the conductor temperature increase.  On the 
other hand, the conductor operating temperature is limited 
by the conductor ground clearance.  As shown in [9, 10], 
the loading capacity or thermal rating of a conductor can 
be described as a function of its temperature, ambient 
temperature, wind velocity, elevation, ground reflection 
and solar radiation.  In a power transmission system, line 
currents during and following a system disturbance may 
reach values above of the steady-state thermal ratings of 
power lines.  Such conditions may be safe for a period of 
up to 30 minutes.  This time can be used to perform the 
generation rescheduling or load shedding in order to clear 
or at least reduce overloading.  Therefore, it is necessary to 
determine how long a conductor can carry an overload 
without exceeding its maximum permissible operating 
temperature.  This problem can be solved by employing 
intelligent knowledge based systems, e.g. [11]. 
B. Loading Capability Assessment of a Transmission Line 
A heuristic nature of the short-time loading capability 
assessment of power transmission lines enables us to use 
an expert system approach.  The rule-based expert system 
includes the basic components shown in Fig. 1. 
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Figure 1.  Expert system for the loading capability assessment. 
 
The knowledge base contains the domain specific 
knowledge in the form of IF - THEN rules.  The database 
includes all relevant data (conductor diameter, conductor 
resistance, conductor unit weight, specific heat, etc.) for 
various types of conductors.  The data is represented in the 
form of a spreadsheet.  The inference engine carries out the 
reasoning whereby the expert system reaches a solution.  It 
links the rules given in the knowledge base and associated 
conditions input by the user with data provided in the 
database.  The explanation facilities enable the user to 
query the system “How” a particular solution has been 
reached. The user interface is the means of communication 
between a user seeking a solution to the problem and an 
expert system.  The external interface allows the expert 
system to work with external data files and programs 
written in C.  These programs are employed for computing 
 
the quantities of heat and adjusting the resistance for 
temperature changes. 
The complete knowledge base consists of 43 rules.  
Details of these rules can be found in [12].  The expert 
system was evaluated against the site tests for both indoor 
and outdoor conditions.  A comparison with actual test 
results demonstrates that the expert system represents an 
accurate model of the actual physical events. 
Fig. 2 displays an example of the expert system query 
screen. 
A practical application of the expert system is 
demonstrated on a power system of Hydro Tasmania 
shown in Fig. 3.  The example described below examines 
the winter night loading conditions. 
Following the outage of the Palmerston - Liapootah 
220 kV transmission line, the current on the Palmerston - 
Waddamana transmission line increases from 182 to 623 A 
(196% of the steady state thermal rating).  The 
temperature-time characteristic and short-time ratings 
evaluated by the expert system are shown in Figs 4 and 5.  
It can be seen that the conductor temperature increases 
from 20°C (initial temperature) to 43°C (the maximum 
permissible temperature limited by the conductor ground 
clearance) in 1 minute.  Therefore, this overload should be 
allowed for 1 minute only.  This conclusion is displayed on 
the screen as shown in Fig. 6. 
 
This question is asked to assign the specific heat value for the 
conductor.  Consider, for example, the cpecific heat at  20  C
of the following conductors:
Aluminium = 900 J/Kg . C degree
Copper  = 385
Steel  = 431
What is the conductor type?
Aluminium
Copper
ACSR
F keys: 1 Help 2 Quit 3 Why?   5 Volunteer 6 Backup 7 Expand 8 Review  
 
Figure 2.  The expert system query screen. 
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Figure 3.  The HEC system: a case study. 
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Figure 4.  Temperature-time characteristics of the Waddamana-
Palmerston transmission line. 
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Figure 5.  Short time ratings for the Waddamana-Palmerston 
transmission line. 
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Figure 6.  Conclusion screen. 
C. Sensitivity Factors 
Permissible loading of power transmission lines can be 
maintained by controlling the real power generation in 
receiving and sending parts of the system, reconfiguration 
of the transmission network and load shedding as 
suggested in [13].  Generator shift factors can be expressed 
as: 
 
 Gj
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Δ
Δ=α          (1) 
 
where ΔSi is the change in power flow on element i when a 
change in generation, ΔPGj, occurs at bus j.  If it is 
assumed that all other generators remain fixed, then the αij 
factor represents the sensitivity of the power flow on 
element i to a change in generation at bus j. 
The network reconfiguration factors are used in a 
similar manner.  The line outage distribution factor has the 
following meaning: 
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where βi,k is the line outage distribution factor when 
monitoring element i after an outage on line k;  ΔSi is the 
change in power flow on element i;  Sk
0 is the original flow 
on line k before it was opened. 
The load shedding factors can be obtained as: 
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where ΔSi is the change in power flow on element i when a 
change in load, ΔPLn, occurs at bus n. 
The overload clearing is a subject to the following 
security constraints: 
 
maxmin
GjGjGjGj PPPP ≤Δ+≤        (4) 
 
max0max
iiii SSSS ≤Δ+≤−        (5) 
 
max
LnLnLn PPP ≥Δ−         (6) 
 
maxmin
jjj VVV ≤≤         (7) 
 
where PGj
max, PGj
min and PGj are the maximum and 
minimum limits and operating value of the generator 
output in MW at bus j, respectively;  Si
0, ΔSi and Simax are 
the original MVA flow on line i, change in MVA flow on 
the same line after an outage of line k and the long-term 
rating (or emergency rating) of line i, respectively (the 
minus sign indicates that the line flow can be either 
positive or negative);  PLn
min and PLn are the guaranteed 
minimum load supply and the original load at bus n, 
respectively;  Vj
max, Vj
min and Vj are the
 
maximum and 
minimum voltage limits and the actual voltage at bus j, 
respectively. 
In order to find the most effective corrective actions for 
a given overload, the sensitivity tree method is used.  The 
tree provides relationships between an overloaded power 
line load and available controllers. 
D. Knowledge Base and Database 
Any overload can be classified using answers to the 
following questions [13]: 
 
1. What is the type of plant? 
2. What is the overload duration? 
3. What is the overload permissible duration? 
4. What are the means available for clearing the overload? 
5. What is the action to be applied first? 
 
This provides the basis on which the database and the 
knowledge base are organized.  The expert system for 
clearing overloads uses the following data: 
 • The upper load limits (short-term rating) for each 
supervised element. 
 
 
 
 
• The permissible overload duration for each supervised 
element as a function of the load.  The permissible time 
for clearing an overload can be obtained using the data 
provided in loading guides [14], calculated, e.g. [9, 15, 
16], or employing intelligent systems as it was 
discussed above. 
• The upper and lower limits for each power station (or, 
if required, for each generator). 
• The long-term ratings (emergency ratings) for each 
power transmission line. 
• The guaranteed minimum load supply (or the highest 
priority load level) at each bus. 
• The sensitivity factors for each supervised element and 
controller, and also the execution time for each 
controller. 
E. Production Rules 
The expert system applies the following heuristic rules 
specified in [13]: 
 
Rule 1: 
IF the real power flow on element i is more than its short-
term rating, THEN element i is overloaded. 
 
Rule 2: 
IF element i is overloaded, THEN include element i in the 
list of overloaded elements. 
 
Rule 3: 
IF element i is in the list of overloaded elements, THEN 
determine permissible overload duration ti for element i. 
 
Rule 4: 
IF permissible overload duration ti is the lowest over all 
elements in the list of overloaded elements, THEN 
calculate the sensitivity factors (generator shift, network 
reconfiguration and load shedding). 
 
Rule 5: 
IF the generator shift list is not empty, THEN select the 
most effective controller AND check its limits AND 
calculate the overload relief on element i. 
 
Rule 6: 
IF the overload relief caused by the selected controller is 
less than the overload magnitude of element i AND the 
controller execution time is less than permissible overload 
duration ti, THEN include the controller in the list of 
feasible actions. 
 
Rule 7: 
IF element i is still overloaded, THEN select next available 
controller on the generator shift list until all controllers are 
taken. 
 
 
Rule 8: 
IF element i is still overloaded AND the network 
reconfiguration list is not empty, THEN select the most 
effective controller AND check long-term rating violations 
on the other elements after the controller is applied AND 
calculate the overload relief on element i. 
 
Rule 9: 
IF the selected controller does not cause long-term rating 
violations on the other elements AND the overload relief is 
less than the overload magnitude of element i AND the 
controller execution time is less than permissible overload 
duration ti, THEN include the controller in the list of 
feasible actions. 
 
Rule 10: 
IF element i is still overloaded, THEN select next available 
controller on the network reconfiguration list until all 
controllers are taken. 
 
Rule 11: 
IF element i is still overloaded AND the load shedding list 
is not empty, THEN select the most effective bus (a bus 
where the load shedding causes the most significant effect 
on the overload relief of element i) AND calculate the load 
shedding required to clear the overload on element i. 
 
Rule 12: 
IF the required load shedding is less than the load at the 
selected bus minus the guaranteed minimum load supply 
AND the shedding execution time is less than permissible 
overload duration ti, THEN include the required load 
shedding at the selected bus in the list of feasible actions. 
 
Rule 13: 
IF the required load shedding is greater than the load at the 
selected bus minus the guaranteed minimum load supply 
AND the shedding execution time is less than permissible 
overload duration ti, THEN include the allowable load 
shedding at the selected bus in the list of feasible actions. 
 
Rule 14: 
IF element i is still overloaded, THEN select next bus on 
the shedding list until the overload on element i is cleared. 
 
Rule 15: 
IF the overload on element i is cleared, THEN take next 
element on the list of the overloaded elements until the list 
becomes empty. 
F. Case Study 
A six-bus system shown in Fig. 7 is used to 
demonstrate the performance of the developed expert 
system.  Table 1 represents bus data of the system. 
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Figure 7.  Six-bus power system. 
Table 1: Bus data of the system. 
 
Generation  (MW)
1 swing
2
3
4
5
6
Bus
Actual Min Max Low 
Load  (MW)
  0
50
60
  0
  0
  0
  0
45
55
  0
  0
  0
  0
60
70
  0
  0
  0
  0
40
40
  0
  0
40
  0
30
30
  0
  0
30
priority 
Hight
priority 
 
 
Table 2 shows line limits and initial MVA flows on the 
lines.  Line 2-6 is overloaded in the initial state.  Columns 
4 and 5 represent flows after corrective actions suggested 
by the expert system have been applied. 
Line flows are determined using ac load flow and 
according to the recommendations made by the expert 
system. 
Table 3 shows available actions which may be used to 
clear the overload on line 2-6 and corresponding sensitivity 
factors.  Some actions are not applicable due to security 
constraints.  For example, a disconnection of line 1-4 leads 
to overloads on lines 1-2, 1-5 and 2-5 and a voltage 
violation on bus 4. 
 
Table 2: Case studies. 
 
 Line Line limit
50.0 
65.0 
50.0 
25.0 
65.0 
35.0 
25.0 
35.0 
85.0 
25.0 
25.0 
32.6 
48.0 
37.3 
12.6 
56.7 
21.9 
29.4 
30.1 
75.1 
6.4 
9.7 
0.0 
60.6 
45.7 
11.6 
55.1 
19.7 
25.0 
29.8 
76.6 
5.9 
10.8 
27.7 
45.2 
33.7 
11.5 
57.5 
21.4 
25.0 
31.2 
74.4 
5.4 
9.2 
Initial flow Case 1 
1 - 2 
1 - 4 
1 - 5 
2 - 3 
2 - 4 
2 - 5 
2 - 6 
3 - 5 
3 - 6 
4 - 5 
5 - 6 
Case 2
 
 
Table 3: Available actions and sensitivity factors. 
 
Action Bus Sensitivity Factor
Generation Increase
Generation Increase
Load Shedding
Load Shedding
Load Shedding
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
Line Disconnection
2
3
4
5
6
1 - 2
1 - 4
1 - 5
2 - 3
2 - 4
2 - 5
3 - 5
3 - 6
4 - 5
5 - 6
-0.0514
not applicable
  0.1824
-0.0148
  0.1093
  0.3484
  0.0745
not applicable
not applicable
not applicable
not applicable
-0.0977
  0.0297
-0.1287
-0.0024  
 
According to recommendations provided by the expert 
system, the following actions are to be applied (Case 1): 
• Bus 2, decrease generation on 5 MW; 
• Bus 3, increase generation on 10 MW; 
• Line 1-2, switch off. 
However, if in a given emergency situation, line 1-2 
cannot be removed from service due to security constraints, 
the expert system makes the following recommendations 
(Case 2): 
 
• Bus 2, decrease generation on 5 MW; 
• Bus 3, increase generation on 10 MW; 
• Bus 6, shed load by 6.5 MW. 
IV.  EX P E R T  SYS T E M  F O R  VOLTAGE CO N T R O L 
A. Problem Statement and Sensitivity Tree Method 
The main objective of voltage control is to maintain 
power system voltages within specified limits under 
various loading conditions and changes in the transmission 
network.  Classical analytical methods based on different 
optimization techniques intend to minimize system losses 
and improve voltage profiles.  However, most of these 
methods are too complex, provide analytical solutions 
only, and cannot recommend appropriate control actions 
required to overcome voltage violations in a given 
emergency condition. 
In order to improve the computational performance, a 
reduced system can be built using the subsystem reduction 
and equivalencing techniques described in [17].  The 
reduced system consists of an internal “three-tier” 
subsystem that introduces the voltage problem area, and 
the external subsystem that represents the rest of the power 
system.  This approach allows to minimize the system size 
and eliminate the less effective voltage controllers.  
Therefore, voltage magnitudes can be predominantly 
controlled by the reactive power injections into the internal 
subsystem.  An expert system technique can be used to 
provide a set of practically effective control actions to 
solve a given voltage problem in real-time. 
Voltage controllers can change their values either 
continuously or in steps, they are not equally effective and 
adjustments required from an individual controller are 
different under different power system conditions.  The 
sensitivity tree method is used to find the effective order of 
control actions to be applied.  It provides the relationship 
between bus voltages and the controller settings.  A 
sensitivity matrix which relates the changes in the 
controlled variables, ΔX, to the changes in the controller 
settings, ΔU, may be described as suggested in [18]: 
 
[ΔX] = [S] [ΔU]        (8) 
 
where matrix [S] provides sensitivity factors between 
settings of the controllers and bus voltages.  Voltage at any 
bus in the system can be adjusted by several different 
controllers.  On the other hand, a change in any controller 
setting results in voltage changes on several buses. 
B. Database and Knowledge Base 
The developed voltage control expert system interacts 
with the power flow analysis package, network sensitivity 
analysis and other external programs and databases.  The 
expert system uses the following data: 
• Upper and lower limits of voltage at each bus; 
• Upper and lower limits of each controller; 
• Sensitivity factors for each load bus and each 
controller. 
When a bus voltage exceeds its specified limits, either 
high or low, a power system operator can adjust 
transformer taps, change generator bus voltages and switch 
capacitor banks and reactors on or off. 
The voltage control expert system performs the 
following tasks: 
 
1. Determine the problem area and build an internal 
“three-tier” subsystem. 
2. Calculate the network sensitivity factors and build the 
sensitivity tree. 
3. Identify all buses with abnormal voltages. 
4. Select the bus with the maximum level of voltage 
violation. 
5. Select the most effective controller, estimate controller 
effect and check security constraints. 
6. If security constraints are not violated then implement 
the controller selected.  If security constraints are 
violated then proceed to the next task. 
7. If the voltage problem still exists then select the next 
available controller until all controllers are taken. 
8. If the voltage on the maximum violated bus has become 
normal then take the next bus with the maximum 
abnormal voltage and repeat the procedures. 
 
Some of the rules implemented in the knowledge base 
are listed below: 
 
Rule 1: 
IF voltage on bus i is below the voltage limit THEN bus i 
is a low voltage problem bus. 
 
Rule 2: 
IF bus i is a low voltage problem bus THEN include bus i 
in the low voltage problem bus list AND arrange buses in 
the voltage ascending order. 
 
Rule 3: 
If all voltage problem buses are determined THEN 
calculate the sensitivity factors. 
 
Rule 4: 
IF the controller list for a low voltage problem bus is not 
empty THEN select the most effective controller. 
 
Detailed description of the expert system developed can 
be found in [19, 20]. 
C. Performance Evaluation 
The purpose of evaluation is to validate the knowledge 
incorporated in the production rules, and to compare the 
expert system performance with a conventional approach.  
Results are demonstrated on the modified IEEE 30-bus test 
system shown in Fig. 8.  The most severe case is an outage 
of transformer T1 connected between buses 27 and 28. 
Fig. 9 shows the one-line diagram of the reduced 
system (equivalent system) for the outage of transformer 
T1.  In this system, all the control measures in the external 
areas are retained.  The “three-tier” internal subsystem 
incorporates the following buses: 
• First tiers: 27, 28. 
• Second tiers: 6, 8, 25, 29, 30. 
• Third tiers: 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 24, 26. 
Table 4 provides results (voltage levels and optimal 
settings of the controllers) given by the expert system for 
the full 34-bus system and the equivalent system, 
respectively, in the case of the outage of transformer T1.  
The results obtained for the equivalent system are very 
close to those obtained for the entire 34-bus system.  It 
indicates that the proposed approach provides a satisfactory 
solution. 
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Figure 8.  The modified IEEE 30-bus system. 
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Figure 9.  The equivalent IEEE 30-bus power system. 
 
Recommendations given by the expert system on 
voltage control actions to be taken under the outage of 
transformer T1 are shown in Fig. 10. 
 
Table 4: Bus voltages and optimal control settings. 
 
 Remarks 
Load voltages 
V3 
V4 
V6 
V7 
V9 
V10 
V12 
V14 
V15 
V16 
V17 
V18 
V19 
V20 
V21 
V22 
V23 
V24 
V25 
V26 
V27 
V28 
 
1.026  1.014 
1.020  1.003 
1.016  0.999 
1.005  0.995 
0.999  1.059 
0.955  1.041 
0.972  1.051 
0.950  1.023 
* 0.943  1.032 
0.957  1.040 
0.950  1.035 
* 0.934  1.023 
* 0.932  1.021 
* 0.937  1.025 
* 0.934  1.026 
* 0.933  1.025 
* 0.915  1.013 
* 0.888  0.998 
* 0.818  0.974 
* 0.796  0.955 
* 0.789  0.971 
1.018  1.001 
 
1.026  1.014 
1.020  1.003 
1.016  0.999 
1.005  0.995 
0.999  1.059 
0.955  1.041 
0.972  1.051 
* 0.950  1.020 
* 0.943  1.031 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 0.887  0.998 
* 0.818  0.973 
* 0.795  0.955 
* 0.788  0.970 
1.018  1.001 
Full system Equivalent 
Initial   Final Initial   Final 
Remarks 
Load voltages 
V29 
V30 
V31 
V32 
V33 
V34 
 
Gen. setting 
V1 
V2 
V5 
V8 
V11 
V13 
Trans. setting 
N:3 - 31 
N:4 - 12 
N:6 - 9 
N:6 - 10 
N:14 - 32 
N:15 - 33 
N:27 - 28 
 
* 0.763  0.955 
* 0.747  0.950 
0.975  1.027 
0.975  1.027 
0.982  0.960 
0.962  0.978 
 
 
1.050  1.060 
1.045  1.045 
1.010  1.010 
1.025  1.025 
1.050  1.050 
1.050  1.050 
 
1.069  1.000 
1.032  0.901 
0.978  0.903 
1.069  0.900 
0.950  0.950 
0.950  1.094 
---  outage  --- 
 
* 0.762  0.954 
* 0.746  0.950 
0.975  1.027 
0.975  1.027 
0.982  0.960 
 
 
 
1.050  1.060 
1.045  1.045 
1.010  1.010 
1.025  1.025 
1.050  1.050 
1.050  1.050 
 
1.069  1.000 
1.032  0.901 
0.978  0.903 
1.069  0.900 
0.950  0.950 
0.950  1.094 
---  outage  ---
Full system Equivalent
Initial   Final Initial   Final
 
Note:  ( * ) bus with voltage constraints violated. 
 
Task 2:    Detect voltage violations
* number of voltage violations:     13
* the lowest voltage occurs at bus:  30               { V(30) = 0.747 p.u. }
Task 3:    Correct voltage violations
Task 1:    Calculate the sensitivity factors 
Action 1:  select controller:   transformer 6 - 9   
adjust its setting:  0.978 0.903 { V(30) = 0.769 p.u. }
Action 2:  select controller:   transformer 6 - 10   
adjust its setting:  1.069 0.900 { V(30) = 0.810 p.u. }
Action 3:  select controller:   transformer 4 - 12   
adjust its setting:  1.032 0.901 { V(30) = 0.839 p.u. }
Action 4:  select controller:   generator 1   
adjust its setting:  1.050 1.060 { V(30) = 0.842 p.u. }
Action 5:  select controller:   transformer 3 - 31   
adjust its setting:  1.069 1.000 { V(30) = 0.846 p.u. }
Action 6:  select controller:   transformer 15 - 33   
adjust its setting:  0.950 1.094 { V(30) = 0.850 p.u. }
** This voltage violation cannot be corrected by the available controllers
** VAR compensation is required  
 
Figure 10.  Voltage control action screen. 
 
The expert system performs well and provides correct 
decisions. The new approach offers the following 
advantages: 
• The computational performance can be improved by 
reducing the size of power systems. 
• The use of the expert system, steady state equivalent 
network and power system reduction techniques meets 
both speed and accuracy requirements for detecting and 
correcting voltage violations. Hence, the proposed 
techniques can be used for on-line voltage control 
applications. 
• Analytical results are complemented by description of 
actions and, hence, are easy to understand. 
V. NEURAL NETWORK FOR ON-LINE IDENTIFICATION OF 
MULTIPLE FAILURES 
A. Fault Identification Problem 
In complex emergency situations, failed protection 
relays and circuit breakers (CB) have to be identified in 
order to begin the power system restoration process.  In 
fact, re-energizing defective or unprotected equipment can 
expand the damage and spread the problem, and it is often 
the cause of cascading blackouts [21]. 
Studies of large emergencies in power systems indicate 
that failures of protection relays are involved in 75% of 
cases [22]. An identification of faulted sections and 
malfunctions of protection relays and CBs requires an 
extensive knowledge of the behavior of protection systems 
during various conditions [23-27].  Due to the fact that this 
problem is non-linear, large-scale and often has a 
combinatorial nature, various artificial intelligence 
techniques have been explored and successfully used. In 
particular, expert system and neural network approaches 
have proved to be the most effective in dealing with this 
level of complexity. 
However, the primary aim of the previous work was to 
locate faulted sections rather than to identify failures of 
protection systems and CBs. Such failures were considered 
as noise, which just complicated the process of locating a 
faulted section.  The task of identifying failures of 
protection relays and CBs itself was considered too 
 
complex as one needed detailed and reliable data to start 
with. Unfortunately, such data may not always be 
available. In addition, protection system analysis is time 
consuming and requires a complex reasoning process.  
During a complex emergency the number of possible 
situations is often enormous, which makes the operator’s 
job of making decisions very difficult.  As a result, 
complex emergencies often lead to large system blackouts 
and serious damages to power equipment.  From a practical 
point of view, it is also desirable to be able to analyze 
complex emergencies with multiple cascading failures 
[28]. 
An emergency in a power system can be represented by 
a set of three vectors: 
 
FRSE ,,=         (9) 
 
where vector S includes one or more sections of a power 
system where a fault occurs, vector R is a set of relays that 
have operated and CBs that have tripped as a result of the 
fault; and vector F is a set of protection devices and CBs 
that should have operated during the fault but failed to do 
so.  Emergency E is considered complex if vector F has 
two or more elements. 
Pattern P of emergency E (referred to as PE) is usually 
observed in a control centre; it is represented by a set of 
alarms.  In fact, this pattern is a mapping of vector R.  
Pattern PE can also be expressed as a set of statements in 
the form: <Alarm name, Alarm value>. In general, the 
number of statements equals to the maximum number of 
alarms provided by the SCADA system. If the alarm has 
been received then its value is 1, and if the alarm has not 
been received then its value is 0. Pattern P of emergency E 
can be represented as a binary vector: 
 
E
m
EEE AAAP ,...,, 21=       (10) 
 
where AiE is the value of alarm i (either 0 or 1), and m is 
the pattern dimension. 
A perfect pattern of emergency E, POE, is a complete 
set of alarms (without any errors in the SCADA system) 
for a single pre-fault configuration of a power system. The 
perfect pattern is, in fact, the set of devices that have 
operated (POE=RE). 
Corrupted pattern of emergency E, PCE, is an 
incomplete and/or distorted pattern.  The same emergency 
can, in fact, be described by a set of corrupted patterns, 
<PCE >.  This set is called the pattern space of emergency 
E, and can be defined as: 
 
E
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E
N
E
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E
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,...,,
......,
,...,,
,...,,
=     (11) 
 
where Ai,jE is the value of alarm i (either 0 or 1) for 
corrupted pattern j of emergency E, and NE is the total 
number of corrupted patterns of emergency E. 
The goal now is to find a set of failed protection 
devices and CBs - set FE - based on corrupted pattern PCE.  
The problem can be formulated as a pattern classification 
problem. In this case, an emergency situation (represented 
by pattern PC,jE) has to be classified into one of several 
possible classes, where each class corresponds to a single 
combination of failed devices (vector FE).  Neural 
networks offer a practical approach to solving such 
complex pattern classification problems [3]. 
B. The Problem Decomposition 
A single emergency may generate up to 500 different 
alarms. However, each section of a power system produces 
its own set of alarms. The maximum number of such 
alarms for a single section does not normally exceed 35-40. 
Thus, in order to reduce the problem dimensionality, a 
neural network should be constructed individually for each 
section.  The solution can be expressed as following [29]: 
 
1. Simulate the response of protection systems in the case 
of two failures. 
2. Form a set of all possible alarms, and a set of all relays 
and CBs that fail to operate. 
3. Form a pattern space of an emergency and creating a 
training set.  
4. Construct and train a NN. 
 
Simulation of emergency situations is demonstrated on 
the 110 kV power system shown in Fig. 11. It has two 
power plants, five substations, 10 transmission lines, and 
14 buses. The protection system consists of 304 relays. 
Fig. 12 represents a graph of all possible emergencies 
when a fault occurs on line L0. As can be seen, there are 25 
possible emergencies that can be caused by this fault. 
There are three emergencies with a single failure (the first 
level of the graph) and 22 complex emergencies with two 
cascading failures of protection relays and/or CBs (the 
second level of the graph).  A detailed analysis of each 
emergency is given in Table 5.  Fig. 13 shows the NN 
used.  It has 32 inputs and 20 outputs.  The number of 
inputs corresponds to the number of alarms.  The number 
of outputs corresponds to the number of devices that failed 
to operate – set F in Eq. (9). 
C. Structure of the Neural Network Identification System 
Preliminary simulations demonstrated that using only 
perfect patterns of emergencies in a training set leads to 
large recognition errors.  To improve the NN performance, 
errors of the SCADA system are simulated by inserting a 
single random alarm error into a perfect pattern.  Also the 
data loss is simulated by removing a single random alarm 
from a perfect pattern. As a result, a set of 5072 corrupted 
patterns is generated and then used to train and test the NN. 
To estimate a similarity between the 25 emergencies 
shown in Fig. 12, the Hamming distance between different 
classes is calculated. The distance between classes EX and 
EY representing emergencies X and Y, respectively, is 
determined as [30]: 
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Figure 11.  The 110 kV power system. 
 
Table 5: Simulated emergencies. 
 
Emergency S Operated relays and tripped CBs, (R ) Failed devices, (F )
E 1 L0 R27,CB77,R46,CB134 R302
E 2 L0 R302,CB77,R46,R32,CB82,R47,R56,CB102 CB134
E 3 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74 CB77
E 4 L0 R27,CB77,R46,R32,CB82,R47,R56,CB102 R302,CB134
E 5 L0 R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74,R46,CB134 R302,CB77
E 6 L0 R302,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74,R46,R47,R56,CB102 CB134,CB77
E 7 L0 R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R28,CB77,R40,CB66,R43,CB74,R46,CB134 R302,R27
E 8 L0 R27,CB77,R32,CB82,R47,CB134 R302,R46
E 9 L0 R302,CB77,R32,CB82,R47,R56,CB102 CB134,R46
E 10 L0 R302,CB77,R46,R47,R14,CB28,R20,CB42,R41,CB66,R44,CB74,R56,CB102 CB134,R32
E 11 L0 R302,CB77,R46,R32,R47,R14,CB28,R20,CB42,R41,CB66,R44,CB74,R56,CB102 CB134,CB82
E 12 L0 R302,CB77,R46,R32,CB82,R47 CB134,R56
E 13 L0 R302,CB77,R46,R32,CB82,R47,R56 CB134,CB102
E 14 L0 R302,CB134,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74 CB77,R27
E 15 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R49,CB88,R11,CB22,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74 CB77,R19
E 16 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,R49,CB88,R11,CB22,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74 CB77,CB42
E 17 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74,R29,R50,CB88,R56,CB102 CB77,R49
E 18 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74,R29,R50,R56,CB102 CB77,CB88
E 19 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74,R14,CB28,R29 CB77,R13
E 20 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,R28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74,R104,CB16,CB36 CB77,CB28
E 21 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R40,CB66,R43,CB74 CB77,R28
E 22 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R28,R43,CB74,R29,R41,CB66 CB77,R40
E 23 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R29,R44,CB74 CB77,R43
E 24 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R28,R40,R43,CB74,R29,R41 CB77,CB66
E 25 L0 R302,CB134,R27,R19,CB42,R49,CB88,R13,CB28,R28,R40,CB66,R43,R29,R44 CB77,CB74  
 Fgfgfgfggr5 
Level I
Level II
 
 
Figure 12.  The emergency graph for section L0. 
 
 
 
Figure. 13.  The multi-layer perceptron. 
 
where NX is the number of corrupted patterns in class EX, 
NY is the number of corrupted patterns in class EY, AXk,i is 
the value (either 0 or 1) of alarm k in corrupted pattern i of 
emergency X, and AYk,j is the value (either 0 or 1) of alarm 
k in corrupted pattern j of emergency Y. 
The NN-based identification system is shown in Fig. 
14. Neural network NN-0 separates emergencies into two 
classes. Class 1 represents emergencies with one failed 
device and class 2 emergencies with two failed devices.  If 
a pattern is classified as an emergency of class 1 then NN-
1 is used. However, if a pattern is classified as an 
emergency of class 2 then NN-2 is used. NN-1 and NN-2 
are trained with patterns describing emergencies with one 
and two failures, respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  The NN-based identification system. 
 
The entire set of 5072 corrupted patterns is randomly 
divided into training, test and evaluation sets. The training 
set includes 2536 training samples and is used for training 
NN-0.  A training example is represented as: 
 
EEE
j
E
j
E
j OOAAA 21,32,2,1 ,,,...,,    (13) 
 
where Ai,jE is the NN input represented by the value of 
alarm i (either 0 or 1) for corrupted pattern j of emergency 
E;  O1E and O2E are the NN desired outputs. If O1E is 1 and 
O2E is 0, then E is an emergency with a single failed 
device. If O1E is 0 and O2E is 1, then E is a complex 
emergency with two failed devices.  
To train NN-1 and NN-2 the following data sets were 
created: 
 
EEEE
j
E
j
E
j FFFAAA 2021,32,2,1 ,...,,,,...,,    (14) 
 
where FiE is the desired value of NN output i for 
emergency E.  If FiE is 1, then device i fails to operate 
during emergency E, but if FiE is 0, then device i operates 
successfully. An optimal number of hidden neurons is 
determined based on the analysis of the network 
performance.  Results are given in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Evaluation results 
 
Neural Networks NN-0 NN-1 NN-2
Input 32 32 32
Hidden 7 13 15
Output 2 20 20
Training 2536 2132 4050
Test 1268 1066 2025
Evaluation 1268 1066 2025
Training 0.0009 0.0009 0.0210
Test 0.0010 0.0012 0.0211
Evaluation 0.0023 0.0013 0.0220
Epoch 600 250 1000
N
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D. Case Studies 
For emergencies with two failures, the NN-based 
identification system can produce three possible outcomes: 
correct recognition, inadequate recognition and incorrect 
recognition. In the case studies presented here, emergency 
patterns are corrupted by both distorted (one alarm is false) 
and incomplete (one alarm is missing) signals. 
 
• Case 1: Correct recognition. 
This case is illustrated in Fig. 15. Emergency E18 
occurs as a result of a short circuit on transmission line L0 
(near Substation F, point 51). The primary transmission 
line protection R302 operates and sends tripping signals to 
breakers CB77 and CB134. Breaker CB134 trips while the 
other breaker, CB77, fails to operate. Substation F is then 
de-energized by tripping CBs on adjacent substations. 
Remote backup protection systems on line L0 (R19, 
R49, R13, R43 and R40) operate and send tripping signals 
to respective CBs (CB42, CB88, CB28, CB74 and CB66).  
All CBs except CB88 trip. Circuit breaker CB88 on 
 
substation E fails to trip. As a result of this failure, the 3rd 
zone of distance relay R56 on substation K causes breaker 
CB102 to open. It results in de-energizing both substations, 
F and E. All devices that operated in emergency E18 are 
shown in Table 5. 
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Figure 15.  Case 1: Correct identification. 
 
• Case 2: Inadequate recognition. 
Fig. 16 illustrates a situation when the system cannot 
identify emergency E16. This emergency is caused by two 
failed devices CB77 and CB42. The first device, CB77, is 
identified, but the second one, CB42, is not. The maximum 
values of the NN outputs indicate failed devices CB77 and 
R19. The reason for an inadequate recognition is the 
similarity between patterns of these two emergencies. (the 
Hamming distance between classes E16 and E15 is 2.2, 
which is relatively small).  Thus, an operator should obtain 
some additional information before making the final 
diagnosis in this situation. 
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Figure 16.  Case 2: Inadequate identification. 
 
• Case 3: Incorrect recognition. 
The corrupted pattern of complex emergency situation 
E7 cannot be recognized. This emergency is a result of a 
double failure: primary protection R302 and local backup 
protection R27 on line L0. The corrupted pattern also 
includes false alarm R20 and missing alarm R49. The NN 
response is shown in Fig. 17. 
 
R
30
2
C
B
74
C
B
28
C
B
66
C
B
88
C
B
42
C
B
10
2
C
B
82
C
B
77
C
B
13
4
R
43
R
40
R
28
R
13
R
49
R
19
R
56
R
32
R
46R
27
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
V
al
ue
 o
f o
ut
pu
ts
actual
desired
 
 
Figure 17.  Case 3: Incorrect identification. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Prototype intelligent systems for clearing overloads, 
voltage control and multiple failure identification in power 
systems have been developed and successfully evaluated.  
The expert system for clearing overloads applies the 
network sensitivity factors to determine appropriate 
actions, which include generation rescheduling, network 
reconfiguration and load shedding. The expert system for 
voltage control is used for detecting voltage violations and 
providing recommendations for solving voltage problems 
in real-time. The multiple failure identification system is 
based on artificial neural networks.  It is used to identify 
failures of protection relays and circuit breakers during 
emergency conditions. This system uses information 
received from protection systems in the form of alarms and 
is able to deal with incomplete and distorted data. 
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